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Abstract 
The paper analyses the interests of China as a member of the G-21, 
which contributed to the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancún/Mexico in September 2003. It concludes that the median 
member of G-21 is more inward-looking and less reform-minded than 
China. A failure of the Doha Round due to a North-South divide between 
the US/EU on the one hand and the G-21 on the other hand would cause 
more harm to the latter than to the former group and would also impact 
negatively upon China, which has fewer alternatives to a multilateral 
round than both most of the other G-21 members and the two big 
players. Thus, China would be well-advised to remain unconstrained in 
its trade policies and does not become member of any group. 
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world trading order 
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I.  Causes and Triggers of the Cancún Setback 
Those not acquainted with the multilateral trading system must be 
puzzled by recent events and developments in the WTO system which 
are difficult to reconcile at first glance.  
On the one hand, club membership in the WTO seems to promise net 
gains which are not achievable to outsiders. Otherwise it would be not 
conceivable why countries like China accepted painstaking and time-
consuming questions-and-answers trials together with far-reaching 
concessions in all parts of domestic economic policy to join the club. 
Candidates like Russia and Saudi Arabia, to name the very few 
prominent outsiders, behaved similarly. Furthermore, the WTO as a legal 
device with an institutionalised dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is 
unrivaled as witnessed by the high acceptance rate of decisions coming 
out of the DSM. Since 1995, when the DSM was introduced more than 
200 complaints were filed and only very few went through repeated 
„slopes“ including the Appellate Body without consensus on the 
implementation of rulings and recommendations (WTO 2001: 27). 
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that the distinction 
between WTO membership and non-membership is not statistically 
significant for explaining the intensity of bilateral trade flows (Rose 2002) 
so that one might argue that non-members face similar conditions of 
market access as members. And above all, a mounting north-south 
divide seems to have breaken ground with substantial frustration in 




fuelled by two factors. First, there has been slow implementation of 
Uruguay Round (UR) commitments in products of export interest to 
developing countries such as textiles and clothing. Second, developing 
countries felt under pressure of strong lobbying activities of vested 
interest groups in developed countries (including NGOs) to negotiate 
issues outside the core of market access. These issues are either 
labeled „non-trade concerns“ (environment, health, investment, social 
standards, competition) or are seen as a one-sided gain for developed 
countries only such as the „extraction of royalty payments“ (Bhagwati 
2001) for protecting intellecual property rights under the TRIPS 
agreement. Southern countries had good reasons to presume that 
widening the negotiation agenda was part of a deliberate strategy of 
northern negotiators to prevent one-to-one trade talks in sensitive items 
as agriculture, subsidies and labour-intensive goods and to play divide-
and-rule games. 
Developing countries hesitantly agreed to start a new multilateral round 
before the commitments of the UR were fully implemented and enforced. 
Though this round was coined as a „development round“ (interestingly 
enough, by the EU and not the developing countries themselves), from 
the very beginning, frustration and scepticism dominated the preparatory 
meetings of the Doha Round (DR) on the side of developing countries. 
Lines of arguments among developing countries were by no means 
homogenous. Some developing countries like the Latin American   
agricultural producers closed ranks with agricultural exporters from the 
„north“ camp such as Australia and New Zealand in the Cairns Group 
which was already active in the UR. Other developing countries such as 
India and  Egypt which do not figure prominently as major exporters and 
pursue more inward-oriented policies, dominated the group of „like-




resources nor much interest to  take an active pro-trade part in the 
negotiations because they either feared terms-of-trade losses as net 
agricultural importers after the phasing out of  export subsidies or worried 
about the erosion of their exclusive trade preferences with OECD 
countries (in particular the African countries). 
In the pre-Cancún meetings, overlapping participation in both the Cairns 
Group and the „like-minded“ countries promoted the emergence of the 
Group-21 (G-21)
1 as the spearhead of resistance against what they 
criticised as the same procedure as in the UR: an implicit understanding 
of the EU and the US in compromising on their bilateral conflicts and in 
proposing a negotiation agenda which reflected common transatlantic 
trade interests. Two aspects supported the G-21 in their critics before 
they met in Cancún: First, the common EU/US negotiation proposal on 
agriculture which - viewed from the G-21 side - basically reflected the EU 
position of protecting the agricultural sector against excessive 
adjustment challenges and, second, the reference to the 1996 Singapore 
Ministerial Meeting where negotiations on competition, investment, trade 
facilitation and government procurement were agreed upon (so-called 
Singapore issues). The EU (together with Japan and insisted that these 
negotiations should be started in Cancún though both conceptually and 
strategically there were good reasons for denying that these issues 
belonged to the core WTO tasks rather than mirroring the interests of 
pressure groups in the EU.  
                                            
*The author acknowledges critical comments and suggestions received from the 
participants of the Conference. 
1   The G-21 comprises Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. During the 




The outcome of Cancún is well known. Negotiations were terminated by 
the Mexcian host without a result. The trigger of the Cancún failure was 
the dispute about the Singapore issues just when the EU seemed to 
compromise on dropping two of the four issues (investment and 
competition) while several African countries insisted that none of the four 
issues should proceed and the Rep. of Korea insisted that all four should 
proceed. Yet, the trigger of the failure was not identical with its cause. 
The Singapore issues were the iceberg of „non-trade concerns“ while the 
G-21 insisted on concentrating negotiations on the basic trade concerns 
such as abolishment of agricultual export subsidies in the EU and the 
US, the phasing out of domestic suppport to farmers in the two areas 
and alleviating market access in both industrial products and agricultural 
products. Causes of the setback were also rooted in the reciprocity 
issue. The US and EU demanded full participation of all developing 
countries in order to discourage freeridership whereas developing 
countries saw slow implementation of previous commitments in the EU 
and US as the bottom point to request unilateral liberalisation measures 
from the Big Two first. Mercantilist games underlying these attitudes can 
be described as the industrialised countries’ view: „without reciprocity no 
concession“ and the developing countries’ view: „without concession no 
reciprocity“.  
It is a fact that the stalemate situation which emerged from mercantilist 
games was particularly applauded by the poorest countries without 
taking into account that they had more reasons to be concerned about 
the costs of the Cancún setback than other developing countries. 
Likewise, it is important to note that China was not among the 
frontrunners of those G-21 countries like India, Egypt, South Africa and 
Brazil which accentuated the dissense with the EU and the US and 




Summit of APEC in Bangkok, the Chinese government reiterated the 
expectation of overcoming the dissense in the multilateral round and to 
bring the DR to a success.  
Yet, to simply argue that Cancún was the typical mid-round crisis which 
also the UR had experienced with the failure of the 1988 Montreal 
Conference and the 1990 Brussels Conference neglects the importance 
of the formation of a developing countries’ pressure group which did not 
yet exist during the UR. This group points to the importance of a 
traditional GATT-originating sin, i.e. the trade off in the system between 
allocation targets (MFN treatment and national treatment) on the one 
hand and distribution targets (special and differential treatment for 
countries „in the stage of development“).  
Mainstream economics express considerable doubts about how 
meaningful it is to anchor distribution targets in the WTO instead of 
concentrating them solely in development cooperation. Yet, mainstream 
economics also underline that welfare gains from liberalisation accrue 
from own market opening rather than from better access to export 
markets, but very few in trade diplomacy adhere to this view. Instead, the 
majority applaudes the infant industry protection argument to legitimise 
special and differential treatment and follows the mercantilist rule that 
imports cause adjustment problems while exports are outrightly 
beneficial. Given this view, one cannot neglect the formation of a 
pressure group simply because its underlying economic reasoning is 
rejected by mainstream economics. 
Therefore, it is necessary to take the G-21 as a new pressure group and 
to analyse their likely impact upon the ongoing development of the Doha 




between major actors in G-21 including China are to be assessed as well 
as its retaliatory potential vis-à-vis the Transatlantic Group (Section II). 
Section III then discusses the alternatives which the major players have 
should the DR fail in order to assess the credibility of their endeavours to 
overcome the setback of Cancún. 
Section IV addresses the self-interests of China to urge for a successful 
conclusion of the DR instead of adhering to the alternatives discussed in 
the preceding section. 
One special aspect for China is the parallel debate on exchange rate 
protection which can, rightly or wrongly, backfire on trade policies 
especially of the US. This aspect is raised in Section V. 
Section VI concludes on the results. 
II.  The G-21 Group as the Third Major Player: Common Interests For 
What or Against What? 
Table 1 highlights characteristics of the G-21 countries with respect to 
growth of their foreign trade, the sectoral structure of their exports, their 
openness, their trade policy and their degree of restrictiveness 
concerning trade with abroad. Overall, an extreme extent of 
heterogeneity emerges. Group members comprise emerging markets as 
well as  low-income countries, inward-oriented countries as well as very 
successful exporters of manufactures such as China and Mexico, large 
economies as well as small open economies. 
Furthermore, the countries differ strongly in their trade policy orientation. 
Except for South Africa, India and Pakistan, the countries are either 




members of APEC or both. That means, that their links to the US as the 
only leading member of both groups is essential for formulating a policy 
in the DR which could be understood by the US administration as 
confrontation. Mexico and China are the two polar cases with respect to 
sovereignty on national trade policies. Mexico is a member of NAFTA 
and is free in determining its trade policy against non-NAFTA members  
since NAFTA is not a customs union. Yet, its dependence on exports to 
the US and the need to coordinate a number of trade-related policies 
with the US (such as rules of origin) make it highly unlikely that the 
country can support a confrontational G-21 policy against the US without 
incurring large losses due to retaliatory actions of the US and without 
damaging NAFTA. On the other hand, China is still one of very few WTO 
member states without any institutionalised regional or bilateral trade 
policy ties to other countries. For the time being, China is a pure MFN 
champion and therefore enjoys the freedom to choose its trade policies 
without coordinating them with other countries.
2 APEC is neither a free 
trade area nor a set of bilateral hub-and-spoke type free trade 
agreements. Ideas to conclude a FTA between China and the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) are neither concrete nor forthcoming for the 
time being since AFTA itself has not yet implemented free trade among 
its member states.  
                                            
2  APEC is not a formalised free trade area like NAFTA and therefore has not been 
notified to the GATT as an Art. XXIV GATT exception. China’s trade policy 
sovereignty is not at all impaired or curtailed by its APEC membership.  Table 1 Trade and Trade Policy Indicators of G-21 Countries 
 Share  of  exports 
and imports  
in GDP 





(Scale from 0  
to 10) 
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Change in product 
structure (share of 
manufactures in 
merchandise 
exports)      










Argentina  11.6  17.5  0.36 0.43 0.12 0.32  5.0  9.3  13  33  4.3  6.1 12.7  0.5  35.0  2.4  2001 
Bolivia  33.1  37.8  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03  3.1  2.8  1  31  6.4  7.1  9.3  0.2  10.0  4.5  2002 
Brazil  11.6  23.2  0.91 0.95 0.64 0.92  6.3  5.1  10  55  4.4  6.4 14.9  0.4  35.0  2.3  2001 
Chile  53.1  52.2  0.24 0.28 0.22 0.27  9.1  10.0  4  16  7.2  8.3  7.9  0.1  8.0  0.7  2001 
China  32.5  44.0  1.80 4.32 1.51 3.83  13.7  10.6  42  88  4.8  7.0 11.3  0.6  51.0  3.3  2002 
Colombia  30.7  30.4  0.20 0.20 0.16 0.20  7.9  4.5  9  31  5.0  6.4 11.8  0.5  35.0  1.1  2001 
Costa  Rica  60.2  71.9  0.04 0.08 0.06 0.10  3.7  13.9  19  62  6.7  7.9  4.6  1.2  48.0  52.4  2001 
Cuba  n.a.  n.a.  0.15 0.03 0.13 0.08  -1.1  -1.0  1  3  n.a.  n.a. 10.9  0.6  30.0  5.1  2002 
Ecuador  42.8  54.5  0.08 0.07 0.05 0.08  7.1  6.3  2  9  5.8  7.0 11.5  0.6  35.0  2.1  2000 





El  Salvador  38.4  57.4  0.02 0.05 0.04 0.08  -4.6  2.9  31  48  4.8  7.4  6.5  1.3  30.0  51.9  2000 
Guatemala  36.8  39.4  0.03 0.04 0.05 0.09  -1.1  8.5  25  33  6.1  6.6  7.1  1.3  28.0  51.4  1999 
India  13.1  19.5  0.52 0.71 0.67 0.78  -3.0  2.6  52  78  4.1  5.7 30.5  0.3  105.0  0.8  2001 
Mexico  32.1  54.2  1.18 2.58 1.24 2.77  15.3  15.5  26  85  7.4  7.3 17.1  0.5  35.0  0.7  2001 
Pakistan  32.6  33.8  0.16 0.15 0.21 0.17  -0.3  -6.3  54  84  4.5  4.3 19.9  0.6  250.0  0.0  2001 
Paraguay  43.9  43.5  0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03  12.8  -0.2  9  16  6.2  7.2 13.2  0.5  28.0  2.1  2001 
Peru  25.5  29.1  0.09 0.12 0.10 0.14  2.7  9.3  1  18  4.4  7.3 13.1  0.2  20.0  0.0  1998 
Philippines  47.7  88.9  0.24 0.52 0.37 0.49  -7.5  17.1  7  74  6.3  7.4  5.2  0.9  30.0  2.4  2002 










1 6.6 7.3 5.3  1.5  43.0 52.5  2001 
Thailand  65.7  110.9  0.67 1.06 0.94 0.98  11.2  4.0  n.a.  n.a.  6.6  7.7 15.5  0.9  80.0  1.2  1999 
Venezuela  51.1  36.4  0.51 0.45 0.21 0.28  3.4  5.3  1  13  6.9  7.0 12.1  0.5  35.0  0.7  2001 
                             
Median  36.8  41.5  0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20  3.4  5.3  11.5  37.0  6.0  7.1 11.8  0.6  35.0  2.1   
1Data refer to the South African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) 
2Data are from International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics database. 
3Indicates data sourced from UNCTAD. 
Sources:  World Development Indicators 2003. - World Trade Organization; Annual Report 2002. - Gwartney, James und Robert Lawson, Economic 




In between Mexico and China as polar cases within G-21, there are 
members of bilateral or regional trade agreements which are either under 
considerable stress (Mercosur, Andean Group, Central America) or not 
functioning as the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
SAARC (India, Pakistan). For all Latin American countries, in particular 
Brazil as a leading member of the G-21, the critical question is whether 
G-21 should be instrumentalised against the US and thus also inject 
tensions into the FTAA process. Hence, given these overlapping 
memberships, the majority of G-21 members (but not China!) have to 
assess whether a confrontational stance against the US in the DR will 
not impair their trade relations with the US either bilaterally or as a 
member of regional groupings. The probability is high that the US will 
raise this issue in bilateral trade talks, for instance, with Latin American 
countries in order to initiate a less confrontational strategy of G-21 or 
even to diffuse the pressure. In this respect, it is interesting to note, that 
shortly after the Cancún meeting and after bilateral trade talks with the 
US administration, some Latin American countries (Colombia, Peru) 
announced to withdraw from the G-21.  
To less extent, these considerations also hold for relations between the 
EU and specific G-21 countries. South Africa (through membership in the 
EU-ACP agreement), and some Latin American countries (Mercosur 
members Brazil and Argentina, as well as Mexico) maintain 
institutionalised preferential or non-preferential trade relations with the 
EU. Yet, except for South Africa, the link is much weaker as for the US 
since the EU is neither a dynamic nor the most important trading partner. 
Thus, its retaliatory potential is smaller. 
Differences in the degree of vulnerability against economic pressure of 




important dividing element in the G-21. Table 1 lists various structural 
performance indicators and trade policy characteristics which describe 
the state of openness, change in export supply and the degree of 
outward orientation in domestic trade policies. The latter can be stylised 
by the level of import protection which is an equivalent to an explicit 
export taxation. The breakdown suggests two conclusions. First, 
measured against a median G-21 country (last line in Table 1), leading 
proponents of G-21 such as Brazil, Egypt, India and South Africa have a 
relatively high level im implicit export taxation and thus are inward-
oriented. Three of them (except for South Africa) offer less freedom to 
trade with abroad than the median country. Second, China is the clear 
outlier. It does not only expose the highest gains in world trade shares on 
both the export and import side among all G-21 countries. It has also 
been the most successful country in diversifying its exports  from 
commodities toward manufactures; two sides of the same coin. During 
the nineties, progress in freedom to trade with abroad has been 
remarkable and was almost at par with the median G-21 country in 2001. 
It is only Mexico which rivals with China with respect to these 
performance figures. 
Coming to the core area of dispute in Cancún, agriculture, there are 
striking differences in vested interests between net exporting Cairns 
Group members on the one hand and net importers on the other hand. 
As China belongs to the latter group, empirical estimates on the effects 
of liberalisation of agricultural trade do not suggest that this sector is as 
important for China under an export-biased view as for the Cairns Group 
members Brazil or Argentina. China, for instance, is a major importer of 
cereals (about 8 per cent of world cereal imports in the nineties and 13 
per cent of developing countries’ imports) compared to Argentina and 




world market prices rise in the short run because of abandoning price 
support and export subsidies in the EU/US, China could incur welfare 
losses (Francois, Weijl, van Tongeren 2003: Table 4.1). The country 
would gain from better market access to the OECD markets in those 
agricultural products it exports. Medium term gains from incentives to 
increase domestic production are less certain as the costs of expanding 
agricultural production by drawing productive resources from industrial 
sectors which show increasing returns to scale (while agriculture is a 
constant returns to scale sector) should not be underrated (ibid). 
There are two further political economy arguments in favor of diverging 
vested interests between China and other G-21 countries. 
First, any liberalisation of textile and clothing trade in the DR contributes 
to release Chinese presence in world markets for textiles and clothing 
and to exert pressure upon low-income developing countries in South 
and Southeast Asia which are specialised in producing substitutes to the 
Chinese supply.
3 If they are not advanced in producing intermediate 
manufactures to be exported to China as a result of increasing domestic 
demand such as textile machinery, they could suffer from terms of trade 
losses due to a DR „with China“. It cannot be excluded that some 
countries in Southeast Asia are responsive to sector-specific lobbying 
                                            
3  The impact of Chinese WTO accession for Asian regions has been empirically 
portrayed by Ianchovichina et al. (2002) and Francois and Spinanger (2002). 
Further lifting of textiles and clothing tariff and non-tariff barriers in the DR would 
lead to further pressures on world market prices due to the fact that tariff peaks 
are still most prominent in this sector. Wang (2003) shows that while Asian newly 
industrialised economies would benefit from the accession due to the expansion of 
world trade and ToT improvement, some countries in Southeast Asia would 
experience more competition in labour-intensive exports and lower prices for their 
products. Again, these are first-round terms of trade effects which do not take into 




against the conclusion of a Round which is feared to hurt them in the 
short run.  
Second, interestingly, it is not even clear that the short-run effects of  the 
outcome of the DR based on terms of trade effects are positive for 
China. The empirical estimates have been ambiguous. On the one hand, 
Francois et al. (2003) conclude based on Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) modeling that the one region which consistently and 
significantly is hurt by manufacturing liberalisation (the most important 
sector relative to agriculture and services) is China. Its terms of trade are 
eroded driven by expansion of textile exports and decline in prices and 
furthermore by increased competition from other low wage countries, in 
particular from India. Trade and income effects arising from intensified 
competition with low wage countries are expected to yield downward 
pressure on Chinese wages. On the other hand, Dessus et al. (1999) 
show (again based on CGE modeling) that China would benefit from 
multilateral tariff liberalisation in terms of welfare gains equivalent to 5.5 
per cent of its GDP. The latter estimates include endogenous total factor 
productivity gains and thus concentrate on dynamic effects which go 
beyond static terms of trade effects assessed to be always smaller than 
the dynamic effects. Anderson and Yao (2003: Table 8) support the 
distinction between short-run terms of trade losses for China due to 
removing remaining post-UR distortions against merchandise trade 
(equivalent to a Doha Round) on the one hand and dynamic medium 
terms welfare gains due to higher resource use efficiency. Though, the 
latter gains are higher than the former losses, Chinese policy makers 
familiar with these estimates could give priority to the short run income 
effects and therefore prefer a „slow go“ attitude. Such attitude would 
support a „sequencing“ of policies, that is first to manage the effects of 




transition period for full implementation of WTO rights for China has 
passed (until 2008) and only in third place support a new round of 
multilateral trade liberalisation. This gradualism would be much more 
cautious and defensive than the outright pressure of Cairns Group 
members in the G-21 for dismantling of domestic subsidies in the 
agriculture sector, for alleviating market access and for abolishing export 
subsidies. 
To sum up, G-21 countries are a fragile pressure group with highly 
diverging interests. Given its unrivaled role as both an export giant (Dutta 
2003) and highly absorptive import market, China does not represent the 
median country in the Group which is less dynamic and more inward-
oriented. It is open to debate (in fact, it can be questioned) whether 
Chinese interests would be furthered if the country would follow an 
uncompromising stance of a median G-21 country.
4 
III.  Alternatives to the Doha Round: Which Actions Might Major Players 
Take? 
The DR has suffered a severe setback but not yet a defeat. Negotiations 
will continue though with more uncertain outcome than before the 
Ministerial Meeting. Yet, one cannot deny that a continuous liberalisation 
track stretching breaklessly from the implementation of the UR 
commitments by the end of 2004 to the beginning of further liberalisation 
steps under DR commitments by early 2005 is at risk to say the least.  
                                            
4   China’s role in the G-21 during the Cancún meeting has been recognised as 
moderate and passive (Schott 2003). This raises the question whether the country 
sees its interests well represented by the leading proponents of an 




The essential imperative is to fix an understanding between G-21 and 
the EU/US which state of negotiations from Cancún should be taken 
home to start with new negotiations. This refers to the Singapore issues 
which in the view of G-21 should be dropped at all but at least three of 
them (except for trade facilitation). As concerns agriculture, the 
understanding should be feasible as the Meeting did not break over 
agriculture but other issues. It is in this sector where a time limit has to 
be taken into consideration, the so-called „peace clause“ from the UR 
under which WTO member states refrain from dispute actions against 
other member states, primarily the EU, on subsidy issues. Should 
member states argue that the EU was the major actor responsible for a 
non-agreement on agriculture, the Cairns Group and G-21 countries 
could put the EU in legal jepardy and thus aggravate tensions unless the 
EU could buy extension via more concessions offered (Thompson 2003). 
The earlier the „bicycle will move again“ in the presupposed  direction of 
a single undertaking for the entire round, the less attractive will be the 
alternatives for the major actors.  
Yet, these alternatives do exist, mainly for the EU and the US, to some 
extent for Latin American G-21 countries but only weakly for Asian G-21 
countries including China.  
Alternatives for the EU 
Traditionally, the EU has been both the inventor and the multiplier of 
regionalism. The majority of „effective“ (in terms of workable) regional 
trade agreements (free trade areas, customs unions or common 
markets) notified at the WTO has some involvement of the EU. They are 
mostly so-called bilateral hub-and-spokes-agreements with the EU as 
the hub and the partner countries as the spokes which do not share the 




with the beginning of the nineties, EU regionalism has changed in two 
ways (Langhammer 2003). First, the EU concluded free trade 
agreements beyond Europe (such as with Mexico) and these 
agreements could no longer be legitimised as a training field for future 
full EU membership. Therefore, today questions of WTO compatibility 
(Art. XXIV GATT) are even more at stake than in the past. Second, the 
EU started to negotiate agreements with a group of countries, the Latin 
American Southern Cone Group Mercosur and thus departed from the 
hub-and-spoke type. The latter new form of regionalism requires a 
minimum of regional policy sovereignty in the partner group which seems 
to exist in Mercosur though unilateral trade policy changes in the 
Argentina-Brazil relationship have undermined the credibility of 
Mercosur. These negotiations are reported to be difficult given the EU 
restrictions on agricultural products and the deliberate policy target of 
Mercosur just to remove these barriers. Hence, in a nutshell, EU-
Mercosur negotiations mirror conflicting views in the EU-Cairns Group 
context at the multilateral level. 
The EU would be in a position to accelerate this new type of regionalism, 
for instance, in the Mediterranean region, with new arrangements in the 
Middle East and Central America, and finally, also in Southeast Asia 
where there is a non-preferential agreement with ASEAN since 1980. 
Stumbling blocs against an easy proliferation of EU regionalism beyond 
the European continent are EU claims for minimum requirements of 
respect for democratic rules including human rights in the partner 
countries. Asian partner countries have always insisted on separating 
economic and political issues in bilateral agreements thus excluding any 




Another EU alternative to the multilateral round reflects a longstanding 
position of some EU member states, notably France, i.e. to deepen EU 
internal integration without a parallel initiative toward extra-area 
liberalisation. To some extent, this inward orientation is prescheduled. 
The EU enlargement toward ten Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) in 2004, the implementation of the ambitious Lisbon targets to 
become the world center of innovation by 2010, the reform of the budget 
and the common agricultural policy as well as working on the political 
integration in tailoring a reasonable division of labour between 
Commission, Ministerial Council and Parliament in a constitution will 
absorb so many financial and governmental resources that the interest to 
revitalise the  WTO process could fall behind. Seen as an entity, the EU 
has become as inward oriented as the US. 
Finally, the setback of Cancún can refuel joint transatlantic trade policy 
initiatives. Given the extraordinarily intensive mutual linkages in foreign 
direct investment on both sides of the Atlantic, companies can act as 
pressure groups to harmonise policies in competition and investment to 
their benefit. Even more importantly, more companies can prevent an 
escalation of retaliatory actions arising from DSM decisions either 
against the US or the EU. A de facto transatlantic free trade area  could 
have sizable trade-diverting effects to the detriment of outsiders including 
China (Langhammer et al. 2002). 
Alternatives for the US 
The Bush Administration has increasingly given regionalism higher 
priority in its trade policy and ranks close to multilateralism. So-called 
„competitive regionalism“ is motivated by the belief  that US trade policy 
interests should be enforced in two ways once multilateral trade 




individual countries should include areas of special export interest to the 
US, for instance, in services. Second, the hemispheric Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) should encompass all Latin American countries 
plus North America. The post-Cancún situation points to the former 
rather than the latter way. The FTAA includes all Latin American 
countries which in Cancún were most critical against specific US trade 
policies, for instance, in agriculture. Such critical stance can be 
duplicated in the FTAA as has already emerged in diverging views 
between the US and Brazil. The former way has already been chosen in 
bilateral Free Trade Agreements between the US on the one hand and 
Singapore as well as Jordan on the other hand. Further agreements with 
Asian countries are in the stage of negotiations. They allow for meeting 
special US political objectives (such as cooperation in security issues) 
and liberalise trade in services which are specific export interest to US 
service exporters. 
Alternatives for China 
Both, the US and EU alternatives point to regional or bilateral 
agreements as a viable alternative to multilateral negotiations should 
these negotiations end in a stalemate. Note that the viability is seen from 
an individual country perspective and not from a world welfare point of 
view. The US and the EU are large economies with considerable 
economic, financial and political leverage and can enforce their interests 
in bilateral negotiations. This is not to say that smaller partners do not 
benefit from  negotiations which are not at level playing field. The „new 
regionalism“ just argues that smaller countries liberalising multilaterally 
first and then docking on to successful regional schemes with an 
institutional setting which promises economies of scale can benefit from 




NAFTA are examples of such sequencing of policies with „multilateralism 
first and regionalism later“. 
Yet, for various reasons, it is very much debatable whether such 
alternatives are available for China, for instance.  
First, there is the option of south-south regionalism, for instance, 
between China and  Southeast Asian countries linked in the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA). The standard trade theory workhorse 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) theory based on factor endowment 
suggests that such regionalism widens the income gap between the 
poorest member state (with unskilled labour as the most abundant factor) 
and the richer member state with a factor endowment where unskilled 
labour is less abundant). The poorer countries would suffer from trade 
diversion because imports formerly supplied by non-member states 
would now be supplied by member states. The poorest country would 
have much less opportunities to increase its exports to the richer partner 
country (Venables 2003). The history of south-south integration in Africa 
and Latin America offers a rich source of experiences of conflicts on so-
called equitable distribution of benefits from integration. Disintegration 
measures were mainly due to distributional conflicts. Due to its vast 
scope of richer and poorer regions inside the country, China’s potential 
record from south-south integration cannot be easily assessed. In free 
trade with ASEAN, for instance, advanced ASEAN countries as 
Singapore and Malaysia would be able to substitute for sophisticated 
manufactures which formerly were imported from countries outside the 
China-ASEAN area. On the other hand, China would benefit from 
exporting to the poorer members of PR Lao, Cambodia, Vietnam and 
Indonesia to the detriment of third country suppliers. Yet, such trade 




minimised. South-south integration, however, is inherently trade 
diverting. It is a side aspect that AFTA is far from being complete and 
that various non-tariff barriers will continue to exist even if tariff barriers 
in intra-AFTA trade have been dismantled. Furthermore, a China-AFTA 
Free Trade Area would have to cope with the problem of trade deflection, 
i.e. the circumvention of Chinese tariff borders by transshipping imports 
through a low tariff ASEAN country. Singapore, a near free trade area, 
would be the ideal candidate. To discourage such practices sophisticated 
rules of origin would have to be introduced and enforced. More often 
than not, these rules are highly protectionist (World Bank 2003b: Box 
3.8). 
In general, tariff barriers in south-south trade are much higher than in 
south-north trade. This holds particularly in agriculture where they are 
often twice as high as high as those tariffs imposed by the OECD 
countries (ibid: 82). Moreover, production structures are often 
substitutive rather than complementary. Therefore, barriers are politically 
difficult to remove. And finally, poorer countries rely on tariffs as a major 
fiscal revenue and thus oppose dismantling if there is no alternative to 
financing the budget.  
China will have to meet each of these impediments when negotiating 
regional or bilateral agreements with developing countries. Most of these 
countries probably fear China’s competitiveness. As the rule of thumb, 
they will be the more reluctant to „go regional“ with China the less they 
see opportunities to penetrate the Chinese market. These are definitely 
the low-income countries which fear trade diversion and losses in tariff 
revenues from free trade with China without being compensated on the 




North-south regional trade agreements both from the theoretical HOS 
point of view as well as from the CEEC-EU and Mexico-US/Canada 
experiences offer the best alternatives of docking on to a large „natural“ 
neighbouring market. At first glance, a Japan-China trade agreement   
possibly supplemented by the Rep. of Korea appears as the Asian 
version of the European and North American type of north-south 
integration. Yet, the first glance is misleading. It can be shown that the 
discrepancies in all areas of trade policies between Japan and China are 
still much too large to be bridged without welfare losses, safeguards, 
rules of origin and other bureaucratic red tape (Langhammer 2001). 
Following the recipe of new regionalism, China requires just the 
prerequisite of multilateral liberalisation first before entering into a free 
trade agreement with an industrialised country. This would hold for a 
China-NAFTA agreement as well
5 but not for the APEC Bogor targets 
(intra-APEC free trade by 2010 for developed countries and in 2020 for 
developing countries) provided that they would really be open to non-
members as the defenders of „open regionalism“ have argued. 
Nonetheless, a multilateral trade agreement appears superior to either 
open regionalism or bilateralism. 
In this respect, it is essential to differentiate between regional integration 
and regional co-operation. The former aims at removing barriers to trade 
and factor movements within a region (therefore sometimes labeled 
„negative“ integration) while the latter concentrates on joint actions and 
                                            
5   This is a purely economic view which neglects political tensions in Northeast Asia. 
From a post-WWII European perspective, one is reminded of the situation in the 
early fifties when discrepancies between national trade policies of the West 
European countries were large and political considerations to tie the former 
political enemy into a set of regional treaties with economic integration as a vehicle 




projects („positive“ integration). Based on the experience of other 
regions, Langhammer (2001) argues that China and the entire Northeast 
Asian region could, substantially benefit from regional co-operation with 
joint projects in cross-border issues like maritime research, preserving 
fish stocks, fighting regional environmental pollution problems, common 
cross-border services like coast guards, and harmonising rules for cross-
border flows of capital, labour and individual persons.
6 
IV.  The costs of „Non-Doha“: More Vulnerability and Uncertainty for 
China 
The preceding discussion has shown that unlike the EU and the US, 
China (and other Asian emerging markets) has fewer alternatives to gain 
safe access to export markets outside the multilateral system. Regional 
trading arrangements and bilateral agreements are imperfect substitutes 
to a multilateral agreement unless they include the EU, the US or Japan 
as the major markets for more advanced manufactured products. 
Overall, a failure of the DR would expose China’s economy in general 
and its manufacturing sector in particular to costly vulnerability and 
uncertainty. Under this heading, a number of issues can be discussed. 
1. Market  access 
One of the „evergreen“ aspects of market access are tariff barriers. While 
they have on average been reduced to 4-5 per cent levels in OECD 
                                            
6  Such joint projects are of course aslo feasible in relations between China on the 
one hand and US or EU on the other hand. At the October EU-China Summit, 
common projects were discussed. Yet, given the geographical remoteness 
between the two regions, the scope of cross-border common projects is more 




countries for industrial products originating from low-income countries, 
averaging hides tariff peaks which plague just those developing countries 
which either specifically supply goods subjects to such tariff peaks or 
generally supply goods in downstream industries at the end of the 
processing stage. The maximum tariff of the EU for non-agricultural 
products, for instance, is 26 per cent (WTO 2003b: 206). The reason is 
that nominal tariffs usually rise with increasing stage of processing in 
order to protect domestic valued added in labour-intensive final 
consumer goods. In technical terms, the effective rate of protection 
exceeds the nominal rate of protection the more the larger is the 
difference between the nominal tariff rates on final goods and 
intermediate goods. China is the prototype of a supplier suffering from 
such tariff escalation. This is why China proposed a tariff-cutting formula 
that would sharply reduce tariffs and reduce high tariffs relative to 
average tariffs (World Bank 2003: 91) For instance, using the Chinese 
formula, the EU initial average applied tariff imposed upon imports from 
low-income countries such as China would decline from 5.3 per cent to 2 
per cent (ibid: Table 2.11). A DR failure would leave China with the 
burden of the tariff escalation. 
Textile quotas are the other major barrier to market access for China. 
Though the abolition of quotas by 1 January 2005 has already been 
negotiated in the UR and therefore correctly should be treated separately 
from the DR, it is evident that industrialised countries (ab)used the 
options of the textile commitments to delay the abolition of quotas. It is 
estimated by the World Bank that by the beginning of the third stage of 
phasing out quotas in early 2002, about 85 per cent of the effective 
quotas against developing countries were not yet abolished (ibid: 79). It 
cannot be excluded that industrialised countries will invoke general 




the transition period after WTO accession) in order to further delay the 
process. A DR failure due to north-south tensions could fuel such 
attitude. How restrictive quotas are still for China is exemplified by the 
high share of clothing exports to non-quota markets in total Chinese 
clothing exports in 2001 (almost 80 per cent; see ibid: Figure 2.8) 
Abolishing quotas would lead to rapidly shifting exports to former quota 
markets and expanding exports in general. As, however, trade is not a 
one-way flow, an expansion of textile and clothing production would 
stimulate imports of China in capital goods, for instance, textile 
machinery, as well as intermediate (fibres, yarn) and thus in particular 
would benefit more advanced neighbouring countries in Asia, such as 
Japan, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, China and Rep. of Korea. 
(Ianchovichina et al. 2002, Francois, Spinanger 2002). 
2.  Efficiency in resource use 
It was discussed above that CGE model results suggest that short run 
terms of trade losses due to the dismantling of trade restrictions in the 
DR would be outweighed by medium-term efficiency gains. Net gains are 
estimated in the range of 9 Bill. US $ per year by 2005 in 1995 dollars; 
about 4 per cent of total world gains (Anderson, Yao: 477). This is a 
magnitude which neither can be neglected nor substituted for by other 
measures. It would help China to internally integrate the poorer 
provinces of the country and to raise their income relative to 
economically leading provinces located along the coast. Especially, the 
high share of the non-traded sector in the economies of hinterland 
provinces would decline thus offering potential for productivity gains and 




3. Anti-dumping  measures 
A recent report of the WTO Secretariat for half year 2003 lists China with 
12 anti-dumping (AD) investigations (out of 79 in total) at the top of the 
list of defendant member states subject to investigations. Traditionally, 
China has mostly topped the list though in general the total number has 
been on the decline (in first half 2002, 21 investigations were filed 
against China). China itself launched 11 investigatons against other 
member states in first half 2003 (WTO 2003a). Definite anti-dumping 
duties raised by China against its trading partners before 2002 ranged 
between 27 and 50 per cent and were far lower than duties raised by 
some Latin American countries at 3-digit levels (World Bank 2003: Table 
2.10). Such discrepancies witness that AD duties are often 
discriminatory. The other negative effect is uncertainty. Investigations, 
even if they do not lead to ultimate anti-dumping duties, have a highly 
distortive effect as they fuel uncertainty during the period of 
investigations when provisional measures are taken. Moreover, there is a 
vast body of literature which witnesses the protectionist abuse of AD 
measures: in many cases, there is no „predatory“ dumping. The costs of 
dumping for the income of consumers and the competitiveness of 
downstream industries of intermediate and commodities
7 (cascading 
effect) are underrated or even neglected and the measurement of AD 
margins is often arbitrary if prices in reference countries are taken as a 
yardstick. In total, AD has become the most widely abused „grey 
measure“ against exporters. 
                                            
7  Intermediates and commodities (such as basic chemicals, base metals, plastics) 




Any successful conclusion of the DR would also include reforms of the 
AD agreement because of the single undertaking principle that forbids 
„raisin picking“ and commits all members to approve decisions taken on 
all sub-issues and their agreements unter the WTO umbrella. Thus, 
China has the chance to remove protectionist tendencies from the AD 
agreement only if it concludes on the entire DR. 
4.  Safeguard measures and dispute settlement procedures 
The discipline of the WTO relative to the GATT has been strongly 
improved by the introduction of a more binding dispute settlement 
mechanism which enables the WTO to pinpoint violation of the rules and 
to identify the member state which is responsible for violating the rules. 
Furthermore, resorting to safeguard clauses has been conditioned to 
clearer preconditions in order to avoid that domestically rooted 
weaknesses of an industry are taken as the starting point of actions 
against trading partners (see the recent decision of the WTO in the US-
EU steel trade dispute against US safeguard measures and in favor of 
EU countermeasures). China participates in the safeguard notifications 
by responding to questions posed by WTO member states on the 
implementation of its safeguard regulation (according to Art. 12.6 of the 
safeguard agreement (WTO Document G/SG/Q1/CHN/12 of 20 Oct. 
2003). It also requests to be informed in third country safeguard 
measures such the EU/US steel import dispute (see WTO Document 
G/SG/Q2/CHN/4 of 17 Oct. 2003) as third parties become directly or 
indirectly affected through changes in international trade flows and prices 
if two parties clash on safeguards.  
The same holds for dispute settlement. Apart from direct involvement as 




included in third party conflicts such as in the dispute between the EU 
and the Rep. of Korea on the alleged subsidisation of Korean ship 
production (WTO Document WT/DT301/2 of 17 Sept. 2003) and in the 
US/EU steel trade dispute where China has joined the group of 
successful complainants against US safeguard measures against steel 
imports. 
Beyond the unquestioned benefits of the WTO DSM, there is undeniable 
demand for improvement especially with respect to the extent of 
implementation of decisions and the timespan required for complying 
with decisions of the DSM panel. Thus, it is China’s self interest that 
such reforms are accelerated before the country itself becomes subject 
to complaints. In the international arena, there is no substitute to the 
DSM. 
V.  „Jobless Growth“ and „Exchange Rate Protection“: Threats for 
China’s Export Base in the Absence of a DR  
It is not only due to the US election year 2004 why China has become 
increasingly confronted with complaints which in the 1980s were already 
raised against the Rep. of Korea, Taiwan China and Japan. In fact, 
allegations of „beggar thy neighbour policy“ or deliberate undervaluation 
of Asian currencies has been for long on the agenda of conflicts across 
the Pacific Rim. The question has always been whether Asian countries 
manipulate their exchange rates and their macroeconomic policy in favor 
of the tradable goods sector by raising prices for these goods relative to 
non-tradables such as services with a high labour content or vice versa 
by suppressing the rise of prices in non-tradables such als labour costs 
(real devaluation). Without going in too much detail, there is consensus 




sufficient to sustain a deliberate policy of exchange rate protection. Nor 
is a bilateral trade surplus of a country against the another country an 
indicator for exchange rate protection of the former. The key indicators in 
favour of assuming that exchange rates are manipulated are monetary 
and fiscal instruments which are targeted to suppress domestic 
absorption so that absorption is lower than it otherwise would be. It is 
also acknowledged that to sustain exchange rate protection over a 
longer period requires companion policies such as capital controls to 
prevent capital inflows which are attracted by a high interest rate policy. 
Such policy could be part of sterilizing capital inflows (the analogy of a 
trade surplus) and be necessary to prevent domestic absorption from 
rising. Such a companion piece does exist in China but seemingly is not 
used as a sterilising device. 
It is not evident that China has pursued an exchange rate protection 
strategy for a long time. Domestic absorption is high as witnessed by the 
rapid rise of imports. Furthermore, the Chinese trade surplus with the US 
is relatively low (relative to cases like Japan and Taiwan China in the 
eighties). 
Yet, as long as the US runs an overall current account deficit, vested 
interests will argue that this deficit has not its roots in US domestic 
policies but in mercantilist strategies of countries which implicitly 
subsidise their exports and thus export unemployment to the US. China 
is the only G-21 country which is confronted with such attacks and thus 
again shares other self-interests than the typical inward-looking G-21 
median country.  
For three reasons, it can be assumed that a conclusion of the DR is 
instrumental to diffuse protectionist threats from the US (and/or from 




strengthen intellectual property rights and thus induce further US 
technology transfer inflows into China and/or draw implicit royalities out 
of China to the benefit of the US. Second, the DR would both specify 
Chinese commitments to further open the market and to secure the 
export base. Chinese economic growth which essentially hinges upon 
imported technology could thus be stabilised and remain a major 
absorptive power in world demand. Sole reliance on US demand as a 
locomotive could be prevented with positive effects on containing the US 
current account deficit. Third, the DR would help China to make its 
financial sector more competitive and to facilitate economic restructuring 
of state-owned enterprises. With the advancement of such process, the 
exchange rate regime and the convertibility regulations could gradually 
approach the standard of market economies.  
VI. Concluding  Remarks 
Seen from Europe, Chinas plays an important role in giving a new 
momentum to the DR and to save the WTO from a post-Cancún 
stalemate trauma. Yet, to play this role, it is crucial for China that it does 
not join any „South“ coalition in controversy against the „North“. It has 
been shown that the typical G-21 median country is relatively inward-
looking and thus tempted to revitalise such conflicts which we know from 
the seventies. China would be a strange bedfellow in this group. Its own 
interests make it a separate player for various reasons. First, its 
alternatives toward regional integration are very much weaker than those 
available to the EU, the US or the Latin American economies. Second, it 
is exposed to the restrictions and uncertainties of the transition period in 
becoming a „normal“ WTO member. This holds especially for sensitive 




stabilise the Chinese export base and guarantee full implementation of 
the UR commitments of dismantling all quantitative restrictions in textiles 
trade. Third, the DR would lower peak tariffs and remove one of the most 
damaging elements of the tariff structure for developing countries, i.e. 
tariff escalation. China as a typical finished goods producer in the labour-
intensive segment would especially benefit from declining tariff 
escalation. Fourth, it secures access of China to state-of-the art 
technology as the „single undertaking“ procedure would commit China to 
fix intellectual property rights protection further. Without such further 
protection, technology-intensive  FDI in China would not be induced. 
Fifth, China needs the WTO discipline in safeguards, DSM and AD 
measures in order to be protected against unilateral pressure. The 
existing framework needs improvement as recent sageguard and DSM 
cases have shown. Finally, China is not directly involved in the conflict 
between „true“ agricultural exporters (Cairns Group), „subsidy-driven“ 
exporters (EU), „free trade scenario“ net importers (Japan) and 
technology-intensive agricultural exporters (US). To conclude, given 
China’s economic size and leverage both on the export and import side, 
a stronger voice of China pro-DR would have a valuable pump primer 






Anderson, K., S. Yao (2003). How Can South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa Gain 
from the Next WTO Round? Journal of Economic Integration, 18 (3): 466-481. 
Bhagwati, J. (2002). Afterword: The Question of Linkage. American Journal of 
International Law, 96 (1): 126-134.  
Corden, W. Max (1985). Exchange Rate Protection. In: W. Max Corden (Ed.), 
Protection, Growth and Trade. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell): 271-287. 
Dessus, S., K. Fukasaku, R. Safadi (1999). Multilateral Trade Liberalisation and the 
Developing Countries. OECD Development Centre, Policy Brief No. 18, Paris: 
OECD.  
Dutta, M. (2003). China’s Economic Presence: Asian Economic Community. Journal 
of Asian Economics, 14 (4): 581-592. 
Ethier, Wilfred (1998). The New Regionalism. Economic Journal, 108 (4): 1149-1161. 
Francois, J., H. von Weijl, F. van Tongeren (2003). Economic Implications of Trade 
Liberalization Under the Doha Round, April, mimeo. 
Francois. J. F., D. Spinanger (2002). Greater China’s Accession to the WTO. 
Implications for International Trade/Production and for Hong Kong. Paper 
presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Global Analysis, 5-7 June, Taipei, 
Chinese Taipei, mimeo. 
Ianchovichina, E., Suthiwat-Narueput, S., M. Zhao (2002). Regional Impact of China 
WTO Accession. Paper presented at the „Trade and Poverty“ Workshop held at 
the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, 20-21 September, 
mimeo. 
Langhammer, R. J. (2003). The Design of EU Trade Policies: Rationale, Results and 
Requirements for Reforming Regionalism. In: R. Pethig and M. Rauscher 
(Eds.), Challenges to the World Economy. (Heidelberg: Springer): 81-96. 
Langhammer, R. J (2001). The Rationale for Enhancing Northeast Asian Economic 
Co-ooperation and some Possible Options: A European Perspective. Paper 
presented at the 2001 KIEP/NEAEF Conference on „Strengthening Economic 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia“, 16-17 August, mimeo. 
Langhammer, R. J., D. Piazolo, H. Siebert (2002). Assessing Proposals for a 
Transatlantic Free Trade Area. Aussenwirtschaft, 57, II: 161-185. 
Rose, A. (2002). Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? CEPR 




Schott, Jeffrey (2003). How to Revive the Doha Round. The Economist, 1 November: 
69-71. 
Thompson, Rachel (2003). Cancún WTO Summit - Note on What Happened. 
Position paper. The Evian Group, September, Evian, mimeo. 
Venables, A.J. (2003). Winners and Losers from Regional Integration Agreements. 
Economic Journal, 113, October: 747-761. 
Wang, Zhi (2003). The Impact of China’s WTO Accession on Patterns of World 
Trade. Journal of Policy Modelling, 25: 1-41. 
World Bank (2003). Global Economic Prospects 2004. Realizing the Development 
Promise of the Doha Agenda. (Washington: The World Bank). 
WTO (2001). Annual Report 2001. Geneva: World Trade Organization 
WTO (2003a). Document G/ADP/N/105, Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
WTO (2003b). World Trade Report 2003 , Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
 
 
 
 